The setup sounds manageable until you realize you have to compare two regimes, bid below 7000 and only defective sellers trade with you, or bid at least 7000 and both types trade.
Model the seller's acceptance behavior based on their type and the bid price, then compute the expected profit for each possible bid. Since the bid must be a single price, evaluate the expected profit at critical thresholds (3000, 7000) and any other relevant points to find the maximum.
Pro tip: In market-making interviews, always clarify whether the bid is take-it-or-leave-it and whether sellers know their own type. Here, assuming sellers know their type and accept if bid ≥ their reservation value, the optimal bid is often at a threshold where you attract both types or only genuine types.
Identify the probabilities, values, and seller reservation prices. Defective: prob 0.7, value 7000, min bid 3000. Genuine: prob 0.3, value 10000, min bid 7000.
For a given bid b, a defective seller accepts if b ≥ 3000, a genuine seller accepts if b ≥ 7000. Thus, if b < 3000, no one accepts; if 3000 ≤ b < 7000, only defective accepts; if b ≥ 7000, both accept.
For b in [3000,7000): expected profit = 0.7*(7000 - b) + 0.3*0 (since genuine rejects). For b ≥ 7000: expected profit = 0.7*(7000 - b) + 0.3*(10000 - b) = 0.7*7000 + 0.3*10000 - b = 4900 + 3000 - b = 7900 - b.
In [3000,7000), profit decreases as b increases, so maximum at b=3000: profit = 0.7*(7000-3000)=2800. In [7000,∞), profit decreases as b increases, so maximum at b=7000: profit = 7900 - 7000 = 900. Compare: 2800 > 900, so optimal bid is 3000.
Check if any other bid could yield higher profit. Since profit is linear decreasing in each region, the maximum occurs at the lowest bid in the region that attracts the desired sellers. Thus, bid 3000 maximizes expected profit at 2800.
AI-generated suggestions, not part of the candidate's original notes. May be inaccurate — verify before relying on them.
First, recall the baseline optimal bid without a signal (e.g., in a first-price auction, bid your expected value). Then, update your belief about the item's value using Bayes' rule given the observed signal, and recompute the optimal bid based on the posterior distribution. Finally, discuss how the signal's precision affects the bid shading and the resulting expected utility.
Pro tip: Emphasize that the optimal bid depends on the posterior expected value, not the signal itself, and that the degree of bid shading should adjust with the signal's informativeness. Mention that in practice, you'd also consider the winner's curse if the signal is correlated with others' signals.
Briefly describe the auction setting (e.g., first-price, independent private values) and the optimal bid without a signal, which is typically a fraction of your expected value.
Specify the prior distribution of the item's value and the likelihood of observing the signal given the value. Assume a simple form (e.g., normal prior and normal signal) to make calculations tractable.
Apply Bayes' rule to derive the posterior distribution of the value given the signal. For normal distributions, the posterior mean is a precision-weighted average of the prior mean and the signal.
Using the posterior distribution, compute the new optimal bid. In a first-price auction, this is typically the posterior expected value minus a shading factor that depends on the posterior variance and the number of bidders.
Explain how the signal changes the bid: a more precise signal shifts the bid closer to the signal, while a noisier signal keeps it closer to the prior. Also mention how this affects expected utility and potential winner's curse.
AI-generated suggestions, not part of the candidate's original notes. May be inaccurate — verify before relying on them.
First, clarify the bidding strategy and the original discrete profit analysis, then explain how replacing discrete values with exponential draws changes the expected profit calculation. Derive the new expected profit using properties of the exponential distribution (e.g., memorylessness, mean, variance) and discuss implications for the optimal bid.
Pro tip: Emphasize that the exponential distribution's memorylessness can simplify dynamic bidding strategies, but also highlight that the optimal bid may shift due to the continuous nature and skewness of the distribution. Show awareness of how this affects risk and expected value.
Restate the bidding strategy and the original discrete profit analysis to ensure alignment. Confirm that the item values are now drawn from an exponential distribution with a given rate parameter.
Express the profit as a function of the bid and the random value. For a first-price auction, profit = value - bid if bid wins; for second-price, profit = value - second-highest bid, etc.
Use the exponential distribution's probability density function to compute the expected profit. Integrate over the possible values, considering the probability of winning given the bid and the distribution of competing bids.
Find the bid that maximizes expected profit by taking the derivative of the expected profit with respect to the bid and setting it to zero. Solve for the optimal bid.
Discuss how the optimal bid and expected profit differ from the discrete case. Highlight any insights, such as the impact of the exponential's skewness or memorylessness.
AI-generated suggestions, not part of the candidate's original notes. May be inaccurate — verify before relying on them.