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IMC·Machine Learning Engineer·Technical Phone Screen·Intermediate

Intermediate
Apr 2026

Summary

IMC put me through a market-making probability problem for an ML Engineer role. The core question was clean but the follow-ups got progressively harder and I'd be lying if I said I handled all of them gracefully.

Questions Asked (3)

Q1

You're a buyer in a market-making scenario. Each item is defective with probability 0.7 (worth 7000 to you) or genuine with probability 0.3 (worth 10000 to you). A defective seller only accepts bids of at least 3000, and a genuine seller only accepts bids of at least 7000. What single bid price maximizes your expected profit, given you can't observe item quality before bidding?

Pricing & MonetizationAlgorithms & Data Structures
Author's notes

The setup sounds manageable until you realize you have to compare two regimes, bid below 7000 and only defective sellers trade with you, or bid at least 7000 and both types trade.

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AI HintsAI Generated

Suggested Approach

Model the seller's acceptance behavior based on their type and the bid price, then compute the expected profit for each possible bid. Since the bid must be a single price, evaluate the expected profit at critical thresholds (3000, 7000) and any other relevant points to find the maximum.

Pro tip: In market-making interviews, always clarify whether the bid is take-it-or-leave-it and whether sellers know their own type. Here, assuming sellers know their type and accept if bid ≥ their reservation value, the optimal bid is often at a threshold where you attract both types or only genuine types.

1. Understand the setup

Identify the probabilities, values, and seller reservation prices. Defective: prob 0.7, value 7000, min bid 3000. Genuine: prob 0.3, value 10000, min bid 7000.

2. Determine acceptance conditions

For a given bid b, a defective seller accepts if b ≥ 3000, a genuine seller accepts if b ≥ 7000. Thus, if b < 3000, no one accepts; if 3000 ≤ b < 7000, only defective accepts; if b ≥ 7000, both accept.

3. Compute expected profit for each region

For b in [3000,7000): expected profit = 0.7*(7000 - b) + 0.3*0 (since genuine rejects). For b ≥ 7000: expected profit = 0.7*(7000 - b) + 0.3*(10000 - b) = 0.7*7000 + 0.3*10000 - b = 4900 + 3000 - b = 7900 - b.

4. Optimize within each region

In [3000,7000), profit decreases as b increases, so maximum at b=3000: profit = 0.7*(7000-3000)=2800. In [7000,∞), profit decreases as b increases, so maximum at b=7000: profit = 7900 - 7000 = 900. Compare: 2800 > 900, so optimal bid is 3000.

5. Verify and conclude

Check if any other bid could yield higher profit. Since profit is linear decreasing in each region, the maximum occurs at the lowest bid in the region that attracts the desired sellers. Thus, bid 3000 maximizes expected profit at 2800.

Key Points to Mention

  • Adverse selection: only defective sellers accept low bids, leading to a 'lemons' problem.
  • Expected profit calculation: probability-weighted sum of profits conditional on acceptance.
  • Threshold analysis: bid must be at least 3000 to attract any seller, and at least 7000 to attract genuine sellers.
  • Marginal trade-off: bidding higher increases probability of genuine seller but reduces profit margin.
  • Comparison of optimal bids in each region: 3000 yields 2800, 7000 yields 900.
  • Conclusion: optimal bid is 3000, accepting only defective items.

AI-generated suggestions, not part of the candidate's original notes. May be inaccurate — verify before relying on them.

Q2

Now suppose you observe a partial signal about the item before bidding. Re-derive the optimal bid using conditional probability based on that signal.

Algorithms & Data StructuresTechnical Trade-offs
Author's notes

This one I fumbled.

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AI HintsAI Generated

Suggested Approach

First, recall the baseline optimal bid without a signal (e.g., in a first-price auction, bid your expected value). Then, update your belief about the item's value using Bayes' rule given the observed signal, and recompute the optimal bid based on the posterior distribution. Finally, discuss how the signal's precision affects the bid shading and the resulting expected utility.

Pro tip: Emphasize that the optimal bid depends on the posterior expected value, not the signal itself, and that the degree of bid shading should adjust with the signal's informativeness. Mention that in practice, you'd also consider the winner's curse if the signal is correlated with others' signals.

1. Restate the baseline model

Briefly describe the auction setting (e.g., first-price, independent private values) and the optimal bid without a signal, which is typically a fraction of your expected value.

2. Define the signal and prior

Specify the prior distribution of the item's value and the likelihood of observing the signal given the value. Assume a simple form (e.g., normal prior and normal signal) to make calculations tractable.

3. Compute the posterior distribution

Apply Bayes' rule to derive the posterior distribution of the value given the signal. For normal distributions, the posterior mean is a precision-weighted average of the prior mean and the signal.

4. Re-derive the optimal bid

Using the posterior distribution, compute the new optimal bid. In a first-price auction, this is typically the posterior expected value minus a shading factor that depends on the posterior variance and the number of bidders.

5. Interpret and discuss implications

Explain how the signal changes the bid: a more precise signal shifts the bid closer to the signal, while a noisier signal keeps it closer to the prior. Also mention how this affects expected utility and potential winner's curse.

Key Points to Mention

  • Bayes' rule for updating beliefs
  • Posterior distribution and posterior expected value
  • Bid shading in first-price auctions
  • Effect of signal precision on the optimal bid
  • Winner's curse in common value auctions
  • Expected utility maximization

AI-generated suggestions, not part of the candidate's original notes. May be inaccurate — verify before relying on them.

Q3

Replace the discrete item values with values drawn from an exponential distribution and redo the expected profit analysis for your bidding strategy.

Algorithms & Data StructuresTechnical Trade-offs
Author's notes

Honestly did not see this coming.

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AI HintsAI Generated

Suggested Approach

First, clarify the bidding strategy and the original discrete profit analysis, then explain how replacing discrete values with exponential draws changes the expected profit calculation. Derive the new expected profit using properties of the exponential distribution (e.g., memorylessness, mean, variance) and discuss implications for the optimal bid.

Pro tip: Emphasize that the exponential distribution's memorylessness can simplify dynamic bidding strategies, but also highlight that the optimal bid may shift due to the continuous nature and skewness of the distribution. Show awareness of how this affects risk and expected value.

1. Clarify the setup

Restate the bidding strategy and the original discrete profit analysis to ensure alignment. Confirm that the item values are now drawn from an exponential distribution with a given rate parameter.

2. Model the profit

Express the profit as a function of the bid and the random value. For a first-price auction, profit = value - bid if bid wins; for second-price, profit = value - second-highest bid, etc.

3. Compute expected profit

Use the exponential distribution's probability density function to compute the expected profit. Integrate over the possible values, considering the probability of winning given the bid and the distribution of competing bids.

4. Optimize the bid

Find the bid that maximizes expected profit by taking the derivative of the expected profit with respect to the bid and setting it to zero. Solve for the optimal bid.

5. Interpret and compare

Discuss how the optimal bid and expected profit differ from the discrete case. Highlight any insights, such as the impact of the exponential's skewness or memorylessness.

Key Points to Mention

  • Properties of the exponential distribution: mean = 1/λ, variance = 1/λ², memorylessness.
  • The bidding strategy context: first-price vs. second-price auction, and whether bids are sealed or open.
  • Expected profit formula: E[profit] = ∫ (value - bid) * f(value) * P(win | value, bid) dvalue.
  • How the probability of winning depends on the bid and the distribution of competing bids (e.g., if competing bids are also exponential).
  • The effect of the exponential distribution's skewness on the optimal bid compared to a uniform or discrete distribution.
  • Potential need for numerical methods if the integral is not analytically tractable.

AI-generated suggestions, not part of the candidate's original notes. May be inaccurate — verify before relying on them.